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DEDICATION
For all those who journey to create their own path. And Mom.
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ABSTRACT
Most work on groups facing collective action assumes that group membership is
static, or fixed. Yet static membership is rare, with members joining and leaving groups.
As a result, most research on solutions to the collective action problem tends to overlook
the concept of dynamic groups. In this thesis, I explore what the presence of newcomers
means for collective action groups—do dynamic groups fare worse than static groups in
terms of coordination and cooperation? The empirical component is focused solely on
addressing whether dynamic groups are less cooperative than static and, if so, whether
this stems from the behaviors of “newcomers,” “oldtimers,” or both. But the paper also
discusses several mechanisms potentially contributing to the effect. Specifically, the
paper discusses how different mechanisms might influence newcomers and oldtimers to
behave differently, consequently driving any differences we might observe between
dynamic and static groups. The analyses yield no effect of dynamic vs. static groups on
cooperation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
How groups come to be successful at resolving the disparity between collective and
individual interests continues to be a hot topic among social scientists. In most collective
action situations, groups encounter challenges organizing and incentivizing group
members to coordinate with (and ultimately benefit) the group. While a number of
researchers have identified solutions to the collective action problem (Kollock 1998),
most of these solutions have failed to account for the fact that group membership in the
real world is rarely fixed (Choi and Thompson 2008; Moreland and Levine 1982). Group
composition transitions through generations of members, retaining some for long periods
of time while losing and replacing others along the way (Moreland and Levine 1982).
Drawing from real world instances, this process can be observed through the systems of
classes in a university or cohorts in a department. As graduating seniors filter out of the
university, incoming freshmen matriculate into it, becoming the newest members of the
community. Similarly, new generations of cohorts are introduced each year to a
department, with the goal of integrating not only into the community of their fellow
graduate students, but the department as a whole.
The introduction and subsequent inclusion of new members into existing groups
creates a different dynamic within the group—one of inexperienced newcomers
interacting with older veterans, or oldtimers. New and old members must address the
novel contexts in which they now find themselves: newcomers often must quickly learn
1

and/or adapt to the group norms while oldtimers, recognizing the change in group
composition, must adjust to the presence of newcomers (Levine and Moreland 1990).
This prompts the investigation of newcomers and their effect on the group’s ability to
manage its collective interests. Specifically, the purpose of this study is to examine the
impact of newcomers on cooperation in collective action. While a majority of past
research on cooperation assumes static group membership, few have considered whether
dynamic group membership has different consequences for collective action situations.
Knowing that fixed groups struggle to organize and incentivize members to cooperate,
the current research explores the implications of changing membership on collective
action. Due to the relatively small body of literature on dynamic groups in collective
action, their impact on cooperation remains inconclusive among researchers. As such, the
question of whether dynamic group composition differentially alters cooperation (as
compared to static group cooperation) endures. The present study attempts to identify
how cooperation differs between static and dynamic group memberships in collective
action. Specifically, the study seeks to answer whether dynamic groups contend with
more destructive disadvantages when attempting to coordinate cooperative behavior from
group members.
Answering this question has important implications for research on dynamic
groups. Primarily, the present research seeks to extend past research on unstable group
memberships in collective action. By expressly examining dynamic groups and their
impact on cooperation, I am to assess the extent to which newcomers influence and
damage collective action situations. Answering this question might motivate scholars to
explore new, unexplored solutions for collective action. For instance, if we find that the
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introduction of newcomers lead to novel consequences for collective action groups,
existing solutions devised under the assumption of static membership require revision.
Because group composition is rarely stable, accepted solutions may not be effective at
solving the problems of collective action groups characterized by dynamism. By
investigating this question, scholars might uncover more robust solutions to collective
action problems.
The Problem of Collective Action
Collective action refers to action taken by a group of people in pursuit of a common
outcome or goal (Harden 1982). Group members share some interest in achieving the
outcome and are interested in seeing the goal realized. The caveat in collective action
situations is that the outcome is typically one that is unattainable by a sole individual
actor (Olson 1965). That is, the effort of one actor alone cannot realize the task; as such,
multiple actors with shared interests come together to contribute to the task and share in
its benefits (Harden 1982).
The key problem with collective action is that individual interest does not always
coincide with collective interest. As Olson notes, just as individuals share an interest in a
collective outcome, they also have purely individual interests (1965). What’s more, as
rational actors, individuals are inclined to maximize their own personal welfare—even if
this action comes as a cost to the collective good (Olson 1965). An individual may be
motivated by self-interest to neglect the collective good—yet because he is a member of
the group, he can still receive its benefits. Thus, actors may seek out short-term benefits
for themselves, as the actor profits more when all others contribute to the collective good
and he does not (Olson 1965). Termed free riding, although he may not contribute to the
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good, he still shares equally in its rewards (Ostrom 2000). In this case, the actor benefits
at no cost to himself—therefore the temptation to free ride is high. However, if all
individuals in the group behaved in this fashion, the costs would be great (Harden 1982).
If all group members pursued self-interest over the group, there would be no group
benefits (Harden 1982).
Individuals encounter situations where they must decide whether to pursue
personal or collective interest. Faced with a dilemma, the individual decides between
contributing to the good and exploiting it. Thus collective effort is marred by social
dilemmas—those situations where individual rationality by all leads to collective
irrationality (Kollock 1998). Because of temptation to pursue self-interest, groups are
tasked with the challenge of organizing and motivating group members to contribute to
the collective good. For successful collective action, the group (or intervening institution)
must coordinate its members’ actions in ways that benefit the group and its desired
outcomes (Ostrom 1990). The group may encourage cooperation through incentives, yet
also deter free-riding through sanctions (Oliver 1980; Ostrom 1990). Collective action is
most effective when the group organizes its member contributions in patterns that
complement one another, profiting the group as a whole.
Devising solutions to collective action problems has been a hot topic in social
scientific research. One of the first to consider the topic, Olson proposed the idea of
selective incentives as solutions for collective action problems (1965). Selective
incentives are private benefits given to group members for their contributions to the
group (Olson 1965). According to Olson, material or social incentives motivate selfinterested individuals to contribute to the group (1965). Selective incentives can also be
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coercive—that is, the group can incentivize contributions by punishing those who do not
burden their share of responsibility for the group’s outcome (Olson 1965). Selective
incentives, as argued by Olson, increase the chances of group success.
More broadly, various solutions to collective action consider how the structure of
the group affects cooperation. For effective collective action, research suggests the
importance of repeated interactions (Kollock 1998; Axelrod 1984). Repeated interactions
tend to encourage cooperation because individuals recognize the influence of a current
cooperative interaction on subsequent meetings with the same partner. Thus actors have
an incentive to be cooperative in current interactions to ensure future cooperation from
partners. Alongside this idea, identifiability of and information about actors contributes to
successful cooperation. When actors are able to identify other actors and their behavior,
they are held accountable for their actions (Kollock 1998; Axelrod 1984). Providing
information about past histories allows actors to form reputations, which aid successful
cooperation interactions (Axelrod 1984; Kollock 1998). When actors have information
about their partners, they are better able to make productive decisions in the task.
The size of the group also has implications for whether collective active is
successful. Olson first noted that larger groups face challenges in coordinating its
members (1965). As the group grows, according to Olson, communication becomes more
costly and the group less successful at organization (1965). Dawes suggests that larger
groups face problems in collective action because harm from non-cooperation is diffused
throughout the group (1980). In smaller groups, when individuals are not cooperative, the
behavior is more damaging on the group. Larger groups spread the damage throughout
more members, lessening its impact.
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Larger groups also heighten anonymity in the group (Dawes 1980). As noted
above, identifiability aids successful coordination because group members are more
accountable for their actions. In small groups, actors can monitor and hold other group
members responsible for their contributions. In larger groups, individual actions are less
visible to other group members, allowing actors to behave less cooperatively. Because
actors are cloaked in anonymity, their actions are difficult to monitor. Without
monitoring and accountability, group member cooperation may decrease.
Efficacy is also diminished in groups, especially large ones (Dawes 1980). In
group tasks, individual contributions have a less noticeable impact on the group,
prompting individuals to behave less cooperatively. When individuals feel like their
contribution has a large impact, they are more likely to behave cooperatively (Kerr 1992).
Individuals can come to perceive themselves as more efficacious in small groups or by
instituting structural changes in the group (Dawes 1980; Kollock 1998). If the individual
perceives the group as close to attaining its goals, then he may perceive his own
contribution as more influential, thus engendering cooperation (Kollock 1998).
Similarly, groups make it harder to influence others, thus contributing to their less
cooperative outcomes (Dawes 1980). Cooperative contributions in groups are likely to go
unnoticed by others—their influence over others’ decisions is small, yet costly.
Conversely, in small groups or dyadic interactions, actors are more effective at
persuading and influencing others with their contributions.
Sanctioning systems can act as effective solutions to collective action problems.
Olson’s selective incentives, for example, would be an example of a sanctioning
system—members of the group receive punishments for low levels of contributions to the
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group, or rewards for high levels of group contributions. While instituting sanctioning
systems is an effective way to garner contributions from members (Dawes 1980), there
are problems associated with sanctions. Sanctioning is often costly due to monitoring—
this is especially the case in larger groups (Ostrom 1990). Further, sanctioning itself often
constitutes a second-order collective action problem—that is, it is tempting to free-ride in
providing the second-order public good of sanctions (Oliver 1980; Heckathorn 1989).
Collective Action in Dynamic Groups
As should be clear from the above, organizing collective action poses a problem for
groups. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that the collective action problem is
further compounded when we consider that most groups tend to have dynamic or
unstable group membership. Yet, with the exception of the studies mentioned below,
most of the literature on collective action assumes group composition to be static. This
assumption of fixed membership is problematic in that groups typically experience
movement of members into and out of the group (Moreland and Levine 1982; Moreland
and Levine 2002). Introducing newcomers to the group initiates an adjustment period for
all members—newcomers must adjust to their new environment and oldtimers to the
changes in the group composition. As new members acclimate themselves with the group
and its norms, old members must also adjust to the changes. As such, organization is
temporarily more difficult for the group because all members are adapting to the
differences (Moreland and Levine 1982). Knowing this, it is reasonable to expect a
decline in cooperative behavior from group members (McCarter and Sheremeta 2013;
Weber 2006). However, because past research has overlooked dynamic groups, the extent
to which cooperation declines in dynamic groups remains unclear. Is the deleterious
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effect of collective action on cooperation the same in dynamic groups? Or, is the effect
intensified in groups with changing group membership?
As suggested above, existing solutions of collective action may not be effective in
dynamic groups. The standard solutions reviewed above assume static group
composition, meaning they may be less successful at solving collective action problems
when membership is not fixed. Consider, for instance, the solution of repeated
interaction— this will be difficult to achieve in groups with changing composition.
Likewise, as new members filter in, group members may become more anonymous. As
such, as research continues to delve into dynamic groups in collective action, it might
also examine new solutions that better address and resolve issues arising from the
changing dynamics in the group.
Because the fixed composition assumption is problematic for dynamic groups, it
is important to examine how newcomers impact group cooperation. Thus, the following
section reviews existing research on newcomers and dynamic groups. It not only
considers prior research on the impact of newcomers on groups but also makes
suggestions about how cooperation fares in the presence of new group members.
Prior Research on Newcomers
Much of the prior research on newcomers assesses characteristics of newcomers before
joining the group, and how those characteristics affect group achievement or integration
(Levine and Moreland 1990; Morrison 2002; Stiff and Van Vugt 2008). For example,
Morrison (2002) demonstrates how various aspects of a newcomer’s social network
affect certain outcomes in the group, such as group incorporation and role clarity.
Likewise, Stiff and Van Vugt (2008) demonstrate the effects of third-party information
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on group socialization, finding that receiving information about new members from
alternative sources (rather than the newcomer) positively affects the acceptance of that
member as well as group coordination.
The little research done to address the behavior of group members after the
addition of new members to the group is far from conclusive. While some argue the
addition of new members to an existing group decreases group performance (McCarter
and Sheremeta 2013), others argue newcomers can have a positive impact on group
outcomes (Choi and Thompson 2008; Weber 2006). While the impact of newcomers on
group coordination thus remains undecided, scholars do agree that the reputations of new
members play an important role. When incorporating new members, the reputational
information available to existing members generally impacts subsequent coordination and
cooperation (McCarter and Sheremeta 2013; Moreland and Levine 2002). Moreland and
Levine (2002) demonstrate that as newcomers enter growing groups, coordination
remains high if the existing group members receive feedback about the newcomer’s past
trustworthiness. Lacking information about new members leads oldtimers to experience
uncertainty and mistrust towards newcomers (Zacharia and Maes 2000). In the presence
of uncertainty and information asymmetry, group outcomes suffer (Kollock 1994;
Kramer 1999).
Likewise, McCarter and Sheremeta (2013) demonstrate that replacing group
members with new ones results in overall decreased cooperation and trust in the group.
Especially in those groups where cooperation is already low, the addition of newcomers
may further erode trust and cooperation within the group. However the damaging effects
of newcomers is alleviated when all group members receive information about both
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newcomers’ and oldtimers’ performance histories (McCarter and Sheremta 2013; Weber
2006). These studies provide evidence for a ‘newcomer problem’: not only are there
negative consequences associated with unfamiliar newcomers, but further that an absence
of information about new partners initiates uncooperative behavior from group members.
Knowing this, the following argument addresses the effect of newcomers on groups, in
the absence of information about their reputations or past histories.
Goals of the Research
Because a majority of literature assumes group composition is fixed, research overlooks
issues of group coordination in dynamic groups. As a consequence, we do not know how
dynamic group membership impacts cooperation. The current research seeks to address
the oversight by specifically examining cooperation in dynamic groups. While the
research above suggests there is a decline in cooperation over time, the current research
seeks to distinguish between the declines in static and dynamic groups. Put differently,
how does cooperation in static groups compare to that of dynamic groups? This raises the
question of how the behaviors of dynamic group members differ from static groups when
taking in and interacting with new members. Thus the goal of the research is to determine
whether this behavior is different from the typical decline in cooperative behavior
observed in static groups.
Some researchers have assumed that the mere presence of newcomers engenders
less cooperative behavior from both the newcomers and oldtimers (Moreland and Levine
2002). Of interest, one might compare the behaviors of oldtimers and newcomers in
dynamic groups to determine their effect on cooperation in groups. McCarter and
Sheremeta (2013) attempt to answer this question, using participants’ behavioral
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predictions for their other group members. That is, actual behavioral measures reveal that
an absence of information about performance history of either subgroup leads to low
group cooperation. To account for why this happens, McCarter and Sheremeta look to
predictions about other participants’ behavior—when group cooperation is low,
participants believe the oldtimers of the group will contribute less than newcomers.
Based on this finding, the authors conclude that oldtimers’ behavior is the primary source
of decline in contributions in dynamic groups (McCarter and Sheremeta 2013). Yet,
while their finding does attempt to separate the actions of the subgroups, it uses group
members’ predictions of others’ behavior, rather than actual contribution decisions.
Although the study did not address actual behaviors, it suggests that there may be a
disparity between the cooperative behaviors of newcomers and oldtimers, with oldtimers
cooperating less.
If cooperation tends to decline in dynamic groups, why might this be the case?
Can we pinpoint the behavior driving down cooperation in dynamic groups? The findings
from McCarter and Sheremeta (2013) suggest that the problem rests with oldtimers’
responses to the introduction of new members. The presence of newcomers may prompt
oldtimers to feel anxious about how the presence of new members will impact the
group’s outcomes, resulting in less cooperation compared to the period prior to the
newcomers’ arrival (Ostrom 1999). Uncertainty about the newcomers could drive
oldtimers to engage in defensive behaviors, driving down overall cooperation from this
sub group (Ostrom 1999). The decline in cooperation might also primarily result from
newcomers. Being a newcomer often means new members are uninformed of group
norms. This may lead to lower levels of cooperation, at least in relatively cooperative
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groups (Weber 2006). Alternatively, strong feelings of group commitment may not
immediately arise when joining groups, allowing newcomers to disrupt established
relationships and norms (Cini 2001). It becomes apparent that this is an important
question worth exploring, and that investigating the behaviors of newcomers and
oldtimers separately may yield valuable insights into why the admission of newcomers
generates negative outcomes for existing groups.
The research solely aims to establish whether dynamic groups affect cooperation
behavior and, if so, whether the effect is driven by oldtimers, newcomers, or both. In
particular, it attempts to answer the question of whether dynamic groups fare worse than
static groups in collective action. If we find that dynamic groups do indeed experience
worse outcomes in collective action, we can begin to investigate underlying mechanisms
driving the differences in group behavior. The current research distinguishes between the
behaviors of oldtimers and newcomers to determine how each group might contribute to
the effect. Below I outline several mechanisms through which dynamic group
composition might affect the behavior of group members. There are compelling reasons
to expect either newcomers or oldtimers to drive down cooperation; here I present several
mechanisms that may serve as useful starting points as research begins to probe further
into the ‘newcomer’ problem. I first concentrate on newcomers, identifying those
underlying processes that may trigger new group members’ lower cooperation within the
group. I then turn attention to oldtimers, outlining potential mechanisms driving existing
group members’ decision making.

12

CHAPTER 2
NEWCOMERS & COOPERATION
Joining a new group can be uncomfortable for new members for a number of reasons.
Uncertainty about the group plays a major role in the new members’ uncomfortable
experiences. Newcomers are often unsure of what the group expects of them, which can
lead newcomers to act cautiously (or defensively) in their first interactions with the
group. Consequently newcomer inexperience may negatively impact group cooperation.
Conversely, new group members’ lack of connection to the group may lead the
newcomer to feel more justified in taking advantage of the group. Considering this, I
discuss how the knowledge of group norms, group commitment and identification, and
status processes affect dynamic groups via newcomers.
Knowledge of Group Norms
Groups develop shared expectations for how members should behave, or norms (Levine
and Moreland 1990). Norms begin as patterned behavior within the group that generate
expectations for what group members will likely do; as time continues, group
expectations transition from what group members will likely do to expectations for what
group members should do (Levine and Moreland 1990; Feldman 1984). Norms guide
different facets of the group dynamic—from dictating intergroup interactions to
intragroup behavior (Levine and Moreland 1990). In this way, groups develop
expectations for group outcomes and the behavior necessary to achieve those outcomes
(Levine and Moreland 1990; Feldman 1984). As a new group member, the newcomer has
13

yet to understand his place in the group—group norms and expectations are not
immediately available to the newcomer (Ashforth and Mael 1989). In light of
newcomers’ confusion about the group’s expectations, it should be expected that
newcomers fail to adhere to existing norms. Put differently, if newcomers do not know
the expected standards, they cannot uphold them.
What’s more, lacking information about the group’s expectations may leave the
new group member feeling uncertain (Hellman and McMillin 1994; Jones 1986).
Uncertainty leads the newcomer to adopt a safe (or defensive) approach, exhibiting lower
cooperative behavior to avoid being the ‘sucker’ (Komorita, Sweeney, and Kravitz 1980;
Ahn, Ostrom, Schmidt, Shupp, and Walker 2001). While the new member may have preexisting expectations about oldtimers, in actuality he knows very little about the group
and its members. Knowing this, I predict that newcomers drive down cooperation when
knowledge of group norms is low.
Group Commitment & Identification
Group member commitment leads to greater group success (Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland
1994). Tenure, positive group feelings, and involvement are positively associated with
greater group commitment, particularly in organizations (Mathieu and Zajac 1990). For
example, the more involvement in the group, the more group commitment; likewise, the
more positively one views his group, the stronger his commitment to it (Mathieu and
Zajac 1990). Thus, an oldtimer’s longer, positive time in the group fosters his sense of
commitment to it. Tenure in the group facilitates the process of group commitment,
creating a sense of cohesiveness and solidarity over time (Stevens, Beyer, and Trice
1978). As a committed member to the group, the oldtimer is invested in attaining the

14

goals of the group (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 1997; Wech et al. 1998). Thus, group
expectations for member performance are upheld and desired group outcomes are
realized (Levine and Moreland 1994).
Conversely, when new group members join established groups, initial
commitment to the group is more apt to be low. Looking to the antecedents of group
commitment, newcomers may not immediately experience positive group feelings or
involvement. Because of newcomers’ limited time in the group, the newcomer is
uncertain about group cohesion and solidarity. Uncertainty on the part of the newcomer
creates anxiety and fails to create a sense of commitment to the group (Bauer et al. 2007).
Without group commitment, the new member is not responsible for to the group; that is,
because the newcomer is uncommitted to the group, he does not feel compelled to
contribute to the group’s success (Wech, Mossholder, Steel, and Bennett 1998; Cini
2001). As such, the newcomer’s performance and effort to coordinate with the group is
lower than an oldtimers’, driven by a lack of desire in bettering the group (Levine and
Moreland 1994; Ashforth and Mael 1989).
Related to group commitment, group identification may also influence behavior in
the group. Components of the self-concept are drawn from memberships and
participation in social groups (Tajfel 1982; Terry, Hogg, and White 1999; Fisher and
Wakefield 1998). Individuals come to define themselves by group characteristics,
anchoring their self-concepts to group memberships (Fisher and Wakefield 1998). This
process is often accompanied by categorization; that is, as individuals come to identify
with groups, they also begin differentiating between themselves and others (Terry, Hogg,
and White 1999). The process of categorization creates in-groups and out-groups, where
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one’s in-group is the group with which an individual psychologically identifies (Tajfel
1970; Hogg and Turner 1985). Individuals tend to favor their own in-group, evaluating
their group as superior to the out-group. Thus, individuals are often hostile to and
discriminate against out-groups. (Billig and Tajfel 1973; Tajfel 1970; Brewer 1999).
Oldtimers’ membership in the group fosters their sense of group identity (Fisher
and Wakefield 1998). Relationships form around his group membership, strongly
influencing his sense of self. He adopts those group characteristics as his own,
categorizing the group as his ‘in-group’ and favoring his group over others (Tajfel 1982).
Group identification results in loyalty to the group as well as responsibility for the group
outcomes (Ashforth and Mael 1989; Fisher and Wakefield 1998). The oldtimer feels
responsible for the collective good and is interested in the group’s success. Because the
oldtimer’s intention is to uphold group standards, we should expect that the oldtimer’s
behavior is generally cooperative and beneficial to the group.
Although simple categorization is sufficient to produce a sense of group
identification (Tajfel 1970; Brewer 1999), strong group identification may not be
immediate for newcomers. As a newcomer, fewer (if any) relationships have formed
around group membership. Being relatively weak relationships, the newcomer is less
likely to develop strong in-group feelings and to align his behavior with the group. As a
consequence of the newcomers’ membership standing, the newcomer is less likely to
identify with the group (Kramer and Brewer 1984).
Thus when group identification is low, the newcomer is less interested in the
group’s desired outcomes (Terry and Hogg 1996). A newcomer’s lack of group
identification means he is more concerned with his own agency and interests: he is less
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interested in seeing the group succeed and more concerned with realizing his or her own
self-interests, willing to sacrifice the group’s interests for his own gain (Ellemers, Spears,
and Doosje 1997). Therefore drawing from this body of literature, I predict that
newcomers’ cooperation behavior is lower than that of the oldtimers’, due to low
commitment to the group. Likewise, I predict that low group identification by newcomers
results in lower cooperation from those members.
Role of Status
Status processes may play an important role in dynamic groups. Applying status
characteristic theory (SCT) to the relationship between oldtimers and newcomers may
provide a better understanding of status processes in dynamic group composition.
According to SCT, individuals engaged in a collective task form a status
hierarchy based on evaluations and beliefs about different group member characteristics
(Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch 1972). Known as an observable power and prestige order
(OPPO), hierarchical structure develops almost immediately and influences group
member behavior. According to the theory, members of a group are differentiated by
status characteristics: diffuse and specific (Berger, Cohen and Zelditch 1972). Both
diffuse and specific status characteristics have multiple states that are differentially
evaluated in terms of competence. Specific status characteristics are associated with
specific expectation states—for example, an attorney’s knowledge of law gives rise to
higher competence evaluations in a courtroom setting. Diffuse status characteristics are
also associated with specific expectation states, but differ in that they are also associated
with general expectation states. Sex is considered a diffuse status characteristic, with
male as the advantaged state. Thus, males are assumed to be more capable in general
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while also associated with other specific expectations states. Importantly, characteristics
are considered status characteristics only if there are distinct performance expectations
associated with each of its states.
The theory states that a status characteristic becomes salient when it is directly
related to the task, or if it is explicitly disassociated from the task; once the status
characteristic is salient, it is assumed to be relevant to the task unless specifically
disassociated (Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch 1977). As such, group members come
to form performance expectations for competency in the group task based on status
characteristics, even when those characteristics are not related to the task. The basic
expectation assumption states if an individual has developed expectations, then his
position in the OPPO is a direct function of his expectation advantage, relative to others
(Berger et al. 1977). The structure of the OPPO has consequences for the behavior of the
group members, in terms of performance opportunities and evaluations (Berger et al.
1977; Ridgeway 1982). Not only do high status members receive more opportunities to
act, but they also perform more often (Ridgeway 1982; Lovaglia et al. 1998). Further,
their actions are evaluated more favorably, as compared to low status members (Lovaglia
et al. 1998)
SCT is scope limited to those situations where two or more actors (with at least
one status characteristic differentiating them) are motivated to succeed at a collective
(and evaluated) task. The actors must believe a particular characteristic is instrumental to
task completion; what’s more, all subtasks in the task must also be linked to that same
characteristic. Only in those settings in which these conditions are fulfilled can SCT be
used to make predictions about status processes.
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Simpson, Willer and Ridgeway (2012) argue that collective action situations
satisfy these scope conditions (Simpson, Willer, and Ridgeway 2012). In collective action
scenarios, group outcomes or goals typically have clear successes or failures, with
members favoring the successful outcome. Simpson, Willer, and Ridgeway (2012) use
the example of community gardens—there is either a cultivated garden (success) or a
desolate one (failure). What’s more, members of the community garden desire and value
the cultivated garden over the desolate one. Accordingly, collective action fulfils the taskoriented condition of SCT. Relatedly, collective action scenarios require individuals to be
collectively-oriented (Simpson, Willer, Ridgeway 2012). When deciding upon a course
of action, the actor engaged in a collective action task takes into account what others have
contributed in the past as well as promises of future contributions (Kollock 1998). Thus,
collective action groups fall within the theory’s scope conditions.
In the case of dynamic groups, I posit that the differentiating status characteristic
of interest is tenure or experience in the group (a specific status characteristic). An
oldtimer’s longevity in the group gives rise to higher expectations of competency in the
group. In this case, when newcomers join existing groups, longevity in the group
becomes a salient status characteristic. When a specific status characteristics becomes
activated, actors assume that one state of the characteristic is “better” than the other. All
other things equal, actors come to assume that the individual possessing the higher state
will be more successful on the task; that is, group members will assume that the actor
who has more positively valued states of status characteristics possesses the positive state
of the characteristic instrumental to task success (Berger et al. 1977). In the case of
collective action situations, Simpson et al. (2012) argue that the instrumental
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characteristic entails taking a proactive stance toward achieving the group’s goal. They
argue that this characteristic is instrumental to success because it facilitates successful
cooperation in collective action. In particular, because a proactive stance leads members
to initiate and maintain cooperation, the characteristic is successful at initiating
cooperative groups. Performance expectations form for both states based on possession of
this characteristic. Specifically the group may form performance expectations for
newcomers, such that they expect they be less cooperative, competent, group-oriented,
etc.
The idea that tenure or group membership may be a specific status characteristic
is supported by research demonstrating newcomers typically hold low status positions,
relative to existing members (Rollag 2004; Perretti and Negro 2006). Being less
experienced and knowledgeable of group dynamics when compared to the veteran
members, new group members are rarely afforded high status (Perretti and Negro 2006).
Oldtimers expect newcomers to be passive and apprehensive, and newcomers often
uphold this expectation, gaining group acceptance from oldtimers (Levine and Moreland
1990). Yet, behaving anxiously to satisfy expectations reinforces perceptions of
newcomers’ incompetence. Negative perceptions about one’s ability further expectations
about low-status incompetence.
In contrast, existing members are important members of the group, encouraging
and influencing newcomers (Perretti and Negro 2006; Rollag 2004). Relative to the
newcomers, oldtimers assume positions of high status (Jetten et al 2010). Accordingly,
the high status members receive more opportunities to perform and do perform more
often (Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch 1980). Not only this, when working in group
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tasks, high status individuals are generally more cooperative in their behavior; as a result,
group members come to expect high status group members to give higher contributions
(Simpson, Willer, and Ridgeway 2012). As such, when high status individuals initiate
cooperation in a public good game, their contributions are often higher than when low
status individuals begin the game (Simpson, Willer and Ridgeway 2012). Oldtimers’
behavior receives higher evaluations from members (even when lower status newcomers’
behavior is equal to oldtimers), maintaining oldtimers’ already high status (Lovaglia et al.
1998). Other studies support this finding, indicating that individuals perceived as
generous or altruistic receive higher status conferrals from others (Flynn et al 2006;
Anderson and Kilduff 2009; Willer 2009). Thus as oldtimers, high status members are
expected to give more and when they do, they receive conferrals of high status from
group members. Therefore one might predict that newcomers’ cooperation behavior is
lower when compared to the oldtimers’, as a result of status processes.
There is evidence, however, that low status members can gain status through
group-motivated behavior. In the context of collective action situations, group-motivated
behavior occurs by contributing resources to the group. According to Ridgeway (1982),
group-motivated individuals, as opposed to strictly self-interested ones, are more valuable
to the group and, as such, their contributions are more likely to be accepted by other
group members. When other group members accept low status contributions, they also
accept the influence of those low status members (Ridgeway 1982). A critical component
of status characteristics theory, attaining influence in the group generates higher status
attainment for the individual (Berger et al. 1977). Thus, if low status individuals wish to
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move up the status hierarchy, Ridgway posits that presenting oneself as group-motivated
might facilitate this ambition.
This contradicts the findings from Levine and Moreland (1990) that found that
newcomers behave passively and underperform to gain acceptance from older members.
Because newcomers are low status members, their expected contributions would be lower
compared to behaviors expected from (higher status) oldtimers (Simpson, Willer, and
Ridgeway 2012). But the Ridgeway (1982) argument suggests that as low status
members, newcomers might show group motivation in an effort to gain status. Their
higher contributions would be considered illegitimate by the group, and subsequently
require members to judge the motivation driving the suspicious higher contributions
(Ridgway1982). According to Ridgeway, members may view the behavior as either
group-motivated or self-motivated (1982). High contributions may be judged as grouporiented and consequently accepted by group members. Alternatively, because prior
research suggests the contributions from low status individuals are self-motivated
(Ridgeway 1978; Lovaglia et al. 1998), high contributions might be perceived as low
status members having underlying ulterior motives. In the context of the situation where
newcomers are expected to be passive group members, rather than signaling a desire for
group success, high contributions might raise red flags for existing group members.
Cooperative behavior conflicts with the low status position (Lovaglia et. al 1998);
appearing group motivated as a newcomer may upset the existing structure, subjecting
newcomers to sanctions by other members (perhaps the older members view the
newcomer as presumptuous or brash) (Lovagalia et al. 1998). Although newcomers may
be contributing at high levels to the group, their actions will be evaluated less favorably
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than equal behavior from high status members—regardless of whether or not the
individual is group-motivated. Lovagalia et al. point out that high status members often
devalue or ignore contributions from low status individuals (1998). As such, oldtimers
may dismiss group-motivated, high contributions from low status member as illegitimate.
As a result, high contributions from newcomers may not see comparable increases in
expectations about their proactive orientation (as compared to high contributions from
high status oldtimers) (Lovaglia et al. 1998). Because newcomers stand to gain less—
compared to oldtimers—from high contributions, they may behave less cooperatively.
Thus although Ridgeway’s findings suggest high contributions to signal group motivated
behavior results in status gains, newcomers may be hesitant to become high contributors
for fear of upsetting existing status hierarchies and the resulting repercussions.

23

CHAPTER 3
OLDTIMERS & COOPERATION
Current group members must also adjust to the incorporation of new members into their
group. Accepting new members may alter the group dynamic, requiring older members to
modify existing expectations for group coordination. Encountering new group members
blindly—that is, without reputational information about the newcomers—oldtimers may
also feel uncertain about the group and its altered composition. Oldtimers face the
possibility of exploitation by newcomers and react accordingly, with the potential for
damaging group cooperation. On the other hand, oldtimers may view newcomers as
advantageous for their self-interest, using newcomer introduction as an opportunity to
exploit the group. The following section addresses the underlying processes of trust and
anonymity and their effects on oldtimer cooperation behavior in dynamic groups.
Trust (or lack thereof)
As briefly noted above, newcomer presence leaves oldtimers feeling uncertain about the
group (McCarter and Sheremeta 2013; Kramer 1999). Trust within the group suffers as a
consequence of uncertainty in the new group dynamic—oldtimers are suspicious of
whether newcomers will adhere to established group norms (Maden, Mosakowski, and
Zaheer 2003). Without information about a newcomer’s reputation, oldtimers are left
with little information about the newcomer on which to base trust (Bolton, Katok, and
Ockenfels 2005; Moreland and Levine 2002). Oldtimers struggle to determine the extent
to which the newcomer’s actions will benefit or harm the group. Accordingly,
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oldtimers may take a defensive approach, lowering their own cooperation to avoid
becoming a ‘sucker’ in future group tasks (Komorita, Sweeney, and Kravitz 1980; Ahn,
Ostrom, Schmidt, Shupp, and Walker 2001).
Interestingly, McCarter and Sheremeta suggest that oldtimer distrust of other
oldtimers may contribute to the breakdown of cooperation (2013). According to
McCarter and Sheremeta, when group cooperation is low, both newcomers and oldtimers
predicted that oldtimers’ contributions would decrease as incoming new members join
groups (2013). McCarter and Sheremeta suggest oldtimers react to the existing groups’
inability to coordinate, causing oldtimers to distrust each other. Subsequently, when
introducing newcomers to group, oldtimers exhibit lower cooperative behavior as the
result of added uncertainty to a low cooperating group.
Whether oldtimers distrust newcomers or other oldtimers, trust is important to the
group outcome. Trust aids coordination and cooperation within a group, allowing group
members to establish cooperative group norms (Dirks and Ferrin 2001). Trust within the
group eliminates the fear of exploitation, allowing members to be highly cooperative for
the benefit of the group (De Cremer 1999; Dirks and Ferrin 2001). Newcomers disrupt
trust in the group—thus, as trust collapses within the group, so too does group
cooperation.
Anonymity
Anonymity negatively impacts collective action. Under the cloak of anonymity, group
members are tempted to act in self-interested ways (Sweeney 1973). Anonymity
eliminates worry about others’ evaluations of behavior, reducing concern for the

25

individual’s reputation (Haley and Fessler 2005). In the end, anonymity typically results
in degenerative cooperation and other unsuccessful group outcomes.
As the composition of the group changes and new members are incorporated into
the group, the group turns its attention to the new members. Interested in the new
members and their impending effect on the group, oldtimers’ energy and attention is
diverted from the group to the newcomer (Cini 2001). Oldtimers become concerned with
the newcomer’s integration in the group (Cini 2001; Rollag 2004). Unsurprisingly then,
notions of relative anonymity tend to be eliminated for the newcomer; his actions are on
display for group scrutiny. At the same time, oldtimers’ feelings of anonymity are likely
to be elevated. That is, as the group focuses on incorporating and socializing newcomers,
the actions of oldtimers’ are relatively unnoticed (Rollag 2004; Cini 2001). Because the
group is more apt to overlook oldtimer behavior, those members desiring to further their
own self-interest are better able to do so with little resistance or consequence. Newcomer
incorporation provides oldtimers’ the opportunity to exploit the group, as the group will
associate the decline in cooperation with the newcomers. As a result, as oldtimer
anonymity in the group increases, oldtimers’ cooperative behavior is lower when
compared to newcomers’.
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CHAPTER 4
METHOD
To summarize, the foregoing suggests several possible consequences for dynamic groups,
including predictions for newcomer and oldtimer behavior. Of primary interest, the
research makes predictions about the influence of dynamic groups on cooperation. In
prior research on dynamic collective action groups, newcomers have been shown to have
a damaging effect on cooperation (McCarter and Sheremta 2013; Weber 2006). What’s
more, there is some evidence to suggest that in dynamic groups, cooperation is lower than
in static groups (McCarter and Sheremeta 2013). Because the arrival of newcomers
marks a transition period for the group, coordinating cooperation among members is
more difficult than in static groups. Based on this, I predict that if newcomers are
introduced to groups, then cooperation declines.
Secondly, it is possible to make predictions about individual behavior in dynamic
groups. Newcomers may influence cooperation within dynamic groups negatively via
norm violation, group commitment and identification, or status processes. Research
suggests that newcomers’ unfamiliarity with group norms may contribute to the
degeneration of cooperation within the group. Thus I predict that if newcomers do not
have access to group norms, then newcomer cooperation is low1. Likewise, as feelings of
commitment aid the success and performance of the group, newcomers may be less likely
1

As will be explained below, limitations with design prevent the current research from exploring this
prediction. Newcomers had access to information about oldtimer contributions. Thus any differences in
newcomer and oldtimer contributions cannot be attributed to uncertainty of group norms.
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to cooperate when compared to oldtimers (Bauer et al 2007; Wech et al. 1998; Cini
2001). Similarly, group identification facilitates cooperation. Newcomers’ lack of
identification allows newcomers to act in self-interested (and thus less cooperative) ways.
Therefore, it is predicted that if group commitment and identification is low for
newcomers, then newcomer cooperation is low. Finally, because previous research
indicates that newcomers hold low status positions within the group (Perretti and Negro
2006), it is expected that they will be less cooperative when compared to those who have
high status, or the oldtimers. This is in line with previous research demonstrating that
holding a high position within the status hierarchy is associated with cooperative
behavior (Simpson, Willer, and Ridgeway 2012; Willer 2009). Based on newcomers’ low
status, I predict that if newcomers are introduced to existing group hierarchies, then
newcomer cooperation declines. Using the predictions about newcomer behavior, one
might expect that if newcomers’ cooperation is low, then dynamic group cooperation is
low.
Alternatively, one might look to the mechanisms driving oldtimers’ degenerative
cooperative behavior. Here, trust is important to group coordination. Newcomers
introduce uncertainty and distrust into the group—whether it is distrust of the newcomers
or existing oldtimers within the group (Kramer 1999; McCarter and Sheremeta 2013).
Oldtimers adjust their behavior in reaction to the distrust in the group. Consequently, as
trust in the group decreases, oldtimer cooperation declines. Relatedly, oldtimers also
react to their greater anonymity within the group. As newcomers join groups, attention is
redirected from existing group member behavior to the newcomers’. Oldtimers take
advantage of the greater anonymity, exploiting the opportunity to gain (Dawes 1980;
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Schuessler 1989). I therefore predict that if oldtimer anonymity is high, then oldtimer
cooperation declines. Accordingly, drawing from these predictions, one might expect that
if oldtimers’ contributions decrease with the introduction of new group members, then
group cooperation decreases.
I intend to test my prediction using data already collected, but not analyzed. The
data were collected at the University of South Carolina in Fall/Spring 2012. The study
collected data on dynamic groups, i.e., groups which grew over time. While the data were
collected to test a series of unrelated hypotheses, they provide a very preliminary way of
addressing a portion of the arguments outlined above. Specifically, they provide one test
of whether dynamic groups lead to lower levels of cooperation and, if so, whether these
lower levels of cooperation are driven primarily by the behaviors of newcomers,
oldtimers, or both.
Design
All groups participated in a public good game. There were two conditions: whether the
group was static or dynamic (namely whether it added members over time). In the static
condition, as in most experimental studies of collective action, all participants began
making contribution decisions in the first round of the public good game; this served as
the control condition. In the second condition, not all participants began making decisions
in the first round of the public good game. Instead participants were assigned to either be
an active group member, or a bystander. As the rounds continued, bystanders were
gradually added to the group until all participants were able to contribute to the public
good. This condition was considered the growth condition. Each session was assigned to
either the control or growth condition.
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Participants
Participants were students in large introductory courses across the university. In return
for their participation in the study, participants received a payment ranging from $5-$20
(depending upon their decisions and the decisions of their group members during the
study). The study took around one hour of their time. A total of 125 participants took part
in the study.
Procedure
Participants were scheduled in groups of seven. Completed in an open computer lab,
participants were escorted to individual workstations upon arrival, where they were
randomly assigned the participant number associated with that workstation. Participants
were instructed to keep their participant numbers private from other group members and
not to reveal their number at any point during the study, so as to guarantee the anonymity
of each participant. Although participants were prohibited from communicating with one
another, they were situated in the computer lab in a way that allowed them to view one
another. Participants were spaced at workstations throughout the room so as to ensure
each participant’s privacy when making contribution decisions.
Prior to beginning the study each participant read and signed a consent form,
followed by a pre-study survey containing social value orientation measures, as well as
demographic information. After experimenters collected the paperwork from all seven
participants, the study began. An experimenter read the instructions aloud, while
participants followed along with their own copy. Periodically throughout the study, the
experimenter would stop reading and prompt participants to answer a question on one of
their quiz worksheets. The worksheets (5 in total) were designed to test their
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understanding of the procedures. After reading through the instructions and answering all
quiz questions, the public good game began.
In the control condition, all seven participants were assigned the role of active
group member; that is, all seven participants began making contribution decisions in the
first round, and throughout the study for a total of 17 rounds. Group members indicated
how much they wished to contribute on their individual contribution slips. Experimenters
collected the slips and entered their contributions into an excel worksheet, providing the
experimenter with each participant’s total earnings for the round. (Note, however, that
individual contributions were de-identified. That is, participants did not know which
group members contributed which amounts.) The experimenter then wrote each
participant’s contribution and total earnings for that round on a white board in the front of
the room. Each group member was able to see the amount contributed and earned by each
member. This condition allows us to roughly control for the decline in cooperation over
time that is typically observed in static group experimental studies of collective action
(Sell and Wilson 1999; Fehr and Gachter 2002). More generally, the condition offers a
baseline against which to compare the growth condition.2

2

Notice that when comparing the dynamic and control groups, there is a confound in the method—while
the size of the control group stays constant, the dynamic group grows across time. This poses a problem for
comparing cooperation between the two conditions. As it stands now, the confound prevents us from ruling
out the possibility that larger control groups are as inclined to experience declining cooperation as the
dynamic group. That is, if we found that dynamic group cooperation declines slower than static groups, this
might be due to the initially smaller size of the dynamic group (as compared to the larger control group).
Indeed, literature shows that small groups are more successful in organizing and coordinating group
cooperation (Olson 1965; Kollock 1998; Yamagishi 1992). Multiple control groups of different sizes would
have allowed us to hold growth constant, while varying newness in the group. However, as will be
discussed below, there was not a significant difference between contributions in the current dynamic and
control conditions. As such, there was no need for these additional conditions.
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In the growth condition, the participants were assigned to one of two roles: active
group member or observer. Three active group members began making contribution
decisions in the first round, while the remaining four group members acted as observers.
In the first round, active group members indicated their contribution decision on the
worksheets. Observers also filled out worksheets—however rather than making
contribution decisions, observers indicated their observer status. This was done to
maintain the anonymity of active group members in the group. After experimenters
collected and calculated the earnings, total earnings were written on the board where all
group members (including observers) were able to view active group members’
contributions and earnings for that round. That is, although observers were not able to
make contribution decisions, they had access to the same information as active group
members.
By providing newcomers with information about existing members’ contribution
decisions, newcomers gain access to group norms. Allowing newcomers to observe
earlier decision rounds means that newcomers can identify group members’ behavioral
expectations for the group, eliminating uncertainty about what is expected of them. The
foregoing argument predicted that newcomers’ lack of group norm knowledge decreased
cooperation in the group. However, because newcomers had access to this information,
the earlier prediction about declines in cooperation resulting from newcomers’ lack of
knowledge of group norms cannot be tested in this study. Any differences in newcomer
and oldtimer contributions cannot be attributed to confusion or uncertainty about group
expectations and norms.
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In the growth condition, after two rounds an observer was added to the public
good game as an active group member. Once an observer became an active group
member, he remained one for the remainder of the study. Every two subsequent rounds,
another observer was added to the group until all observers had been added as active
group members. The final observer was added on the ninth round, and the group
continued making contribution decisions for eight more rounds.
Upon completion of the final round, participants were given a post-study survey
that contained measures designed to assess solidarity, group coordination, and cohesion.
Participants were paid based on their decisions and dismissed.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
I intended to analyze the data using multi-level data analysis, addressing whether, under
these conditions, there is a decline in cooperation in dynamic groups and if so, whether it
primarily stemmed from the lower contributions of newcomers, lower contributions from
oldtimers, or both. Because of the nested nature of the data, the analysis required a threelevel mixed model. Nested data violates the assumption of independence in traditional
regression. Multi-level models account for the dependence of the observations.
Given that I am interested in predicting contributions from group members,
contribution was modeled as a function of time (or round) and whether the member was a
newcomer. Because newcomers were present only in the dynamic condition, the control
condition was not included in the model. A test of nested models was conducted to
specify the effect of time. It was determined that the functional form of time should be
modeled linearly.
Before constructing the model, I looked strictly at the fixed effects to determine if
contributions between newcomers and oldtimers did indeed differ. In the first model,
newcomer status was defined as an observer’s first two rounds in the public good game.
The results from model 1 are presented in table 5.1. The effect of newcomer was nonsignificant; that is, while newcomers contributed slightly more than oldtimers, the
difference was not significant (p = 0.826). The effect of round (or time) was significant,
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indicating that as the rounds increased, contribution decreased by 0.07. This finding is in
line with standard research on contribution decisions in public good games.
In the second model, newcomer status was limited to only those initial rounds in
which the newcomer joined. That is, if the newcomer was added in round 3, he was a
newcomer solely for that round. Thus, model 2 again only included the dynamic
condition. Again, using contribution as the outcome and the same independent variables
from the first model, newcomer was not significant. As in the first model, however, the
effect round remained significant. As rounds increased, contributions decreased by 0.4.
Table 5.1. Coefficients from models specifying fixed effects.
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Round

-0.0685*

-0.3893*

-0.0117

-0.0326

Newcomer

0.0368

0.5325
0.1165

-0.4220

Dynamic_Condition

-0.0399

Round*Dynamic_Condition
*p < 0.01

A third model was constructed to compare the dynamic and control (static)
conditions. Contribution was modeled as a function of time and condition. Different from
the previous two models, both the dynamic and control conditions were included in the
model. The results of this test revealed that contributions were not significantly different
between dynamic and control conditions. Although contributions in the dynamic group
were slightly higher (0.117) compared to the control condition, the effect was nonsignificant (p = 0.215). Contrary to the earlier models, round was no longer significant.
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Of interest, finding that round was no longer significant in the third model
suggested that member contributions were different by round in the two conditions. A
fourth and final model was constructed to determine whether this might be the case. In
the fourth model, contribution was again modeled as function of time and condition.
Different from the last model, the fourth model also included a term for the interaction
between time and condition. Accordingly the model was constructed to determine
whether the decline in contributions as time increased differed by condition.
The results of the model are presented in table 5.1. As in the previous model,
neither round nor condition was significant. Although the interaction terms was also not
significant, the model indicates that as round increases in the dynamic condition,
contributions decline by .0399 units. Thus because neither the newcomer nor condition
fixed effects were significant in any of the models, a multi-level model was unnecessary.
Of note, all models were run twice—with and without the control variables of race and
gender. There was little difference between the models; all effects remained nonsignificant.
.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
Past research of dynamic groups suggests that newcomers have a negative impact on
group outcomes. Of interest to the current study, introducing newcomers to collectively
oriented groups poses a threat to cooperation. While I expected to observe a decrease in
cooperation in the dynamic groups, results revealed no significant difference in
contribution decisions (and thus cooperation) between dynamic and control conditions.
While the literature suggests that newcomers should have a negative impact on
cooperation, the current study failed to identify such an effect. To account for this, one
might consider the design of the study. As noted earlier, the data were collected for
another project, designed to address dynamic groups as a solution to collective action.
The concepts of newcomers and oldtimers were not considered in the design of the study.
As such, the current data may not have been as conducive to determining the effect of
either subgroup on cooperation as other potential designs.
For example, because observers were not separated from the group in the initial
rounds of the public good game, they may have come to view themselves as part of the
group. That is, although they were not able to contribute to the group fund, observers
stillmay have felt like group members because they were included in the instructional
phase of the study with all other participants. Thus, in the rounds where observers were
added, they may already have perceived themselves as existing group members.
Although they could not contribute in the initial rounds of the study, observers may have
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viewed themselves as restricted or limited members of the group, rather than newcomers.
Put differently, observers may have viewed their ability to contribute later on in the game
as gaining rights or shedding limitations, instead of perceiving themselves as completely
new members. This could affect contributions in a number of ways. For instance, a
status-based explanation might suggest that, if observers felt like group members in the
initial rounds, members could not be differentiated based on the characteristic. As such,
we should not expect a status-based process to occur.
Most likely, in my view, newcomers in this study had access to the same
information as oldtimers. As noted earlier, one key reason that prior work suggests that
dynamism impacted contributions in groups is newcomers’ lack of knowledge about
norms. But here there was no difference in oldtimers’ and newcomers’ knowledge of
norms. This likely solved the newcomer problem. Future research might manipulate
whether newcomers do or do not have access to prior decisions, as well as whether
oldtimers know that newcomers have this information.
It might be useful to also consider how newcomers and oldtimers were
operationalized. In the current study oldtimer was operationalized in one of two ways.
Initial active group members were considered oldtimers. After a newcomer’s second
round, the newcomer was considered an oldtimer. Therefore, a participant was classified
as an oldtimer at the beginning of his third round and all subsequent rounds. Future
research might adjust the operationalization of oldtimer. It might be the case that oldtimer
tenure in the group was not long enough to foster and develop feelings of group
commitment. Because research indicates that involvement and commitment in the group
are important factors facilitating identification, oldtimers may not have come to identify
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with the group. Thus applying the prediction that lack of group identification leads to
lower cooperation, one might expect little to no difference between oldtimer and
newcomer contributions with the current design. Instead, consider a scenario where
active group members participated in two public good games. In the first game, only
active group members participate and make contribution decisions. In the second game,
newcomers are introduced following the procedure from the present study. Thus, existing
group members would have more opportunity to confirm their roles as oldtimers.
Adjusting the method to lengthen their tenure and involvement in the group before the
introducing newcomers may produce the expected difference suggested by previous
literature.
Alongside this idea, the present study operationalized newcomer as either an
observer’s first or first two rounds in the public good game. This decision was based on
the procedure—every two rounds a new member was added to the group, and the current
newcomer transitioned into the oldtimer classification. An alternative way to
operationalize newcomer might include the member’s first three or four rounds in the
game (that is, the next newcomer would not be added for three to four rounds). A
newcomer’s transition into an oldtimer is a process—it takes time for the new member to
integrate into the group. It could be the case that even after two rounds in the game, the
newcomer may still view the group as novel. Classifying him as an oldtimer after such a
short tenure in the group could have reduced any impact we might have otherwise
observed—that is, finding no differences between newcomer and oldtimer contributions
may be due to the fact that newcomers still felt and behaved like newcomers in those
rounds in which they were classified as oldtimers. If this was the case, then we should not
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expect differences between the contributions. Thus, a different method (and subsequently
operationalization of newcomer) might tap into this process more effectively.
Finally, the null findings suggest that perhaps cooperation in dynamic groups does
not differ from static groups. This might be explained by Sherif’s (1935) classic study of
social influence. Sherif found that individuals are strongly influenced by the judgments
of others, particularly in situations of where the nature of the task is uncertain (1935). In
this case, individuals altered their own judgments to conform to those of confederates
(Sherif 1935). Subsequent work showed that individuals who were initially influenced by
confederates go on to influence other individuals’ judgments (MacNeil and Sherif 1976;
Jacobs and Campbell 1961). That is, past judgments from earlier experiences carried into
a new group and influenced new participants. These new participants then went on to
influence yet a different group. This provides evidence for the idea that norms are
transmitted through generations of groups. Old members influence the judgments of new
members, prompting newcomers to conform to and adopt existing norms (MacNeil and
Sherif 1976). Due to the uncertainty of the situation, newcomers may adopt existing
norms to reduce the uncertainty. The newcomer may simply mimic the behaviors of
oldtimers to avoid appearing incompetent in the uncertain situation.
This influence process makes early contributions very important. If newcomers do
indeed adopt the norms of older members, newcomers’ behaviors should be strongly
influenced by the previous behaviors of oldtimers. For instance, if cooperation in the
group is already low before the newcomer joins the group, it seems reasonable to expect
subsequent newcomer cooperation will also be low. When cooperation is low to begin
with, the newcomer has little incentive to deviate from the norm—in fact, it will be costly
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for the newcomer to do so. Deviating from established norms might draw unwanted
attention and criticisms from other group members, creating an uncomfortable
environment for the newcomer. Thus, early contributions play a critical role in whether
the dynamic group is able to become a successful group. Future work might more
explicitly address the path dependence of cooperation in dynamic groups.
While the current research did not show any evidence that newcomers negatively
impacted cooperation, future research should further address the effects of newcomers in
light of the issues outlined above. Implementation of the suggestions listed might be the
first step in further exploring whether introducing newcomers to a group impairs
cooperation. If the effect is established, research can then turn its attention to tracing the
source of the decline to either newcomers, or oldtimers’ reactions to the arrival of
newcomers. If future work finds that that one subgroup is responsible for the decline, it is
important to identify those mechanisms driving the different contribution behaviors of
newcomers and oldtimers. For now, however, the initial effect needs further clarification
and support before probing further into the investigation of potential mechanisms.
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